Reply to:   A piac farkastorvenyei

Reakcio'k Balazs Diana 48. sza'mbeli reakcio'ira irt reakcioira:-):
Meg mindig nincs szep idezo-sormintam, ugyhogy ha zavaros, ki beszel, nezzetek
az ekezeteket.
------------------

>VB:  Nem e'rtem, mi a baj a farkasto"rve'nyekkel? Ha szerinted a piac a'ltal
dikta'lt energiaa'r (persze tudom, hogy
itt valamife'le szaba'lyozott, 2nd best monopolpiacro'l van szo', az
energiaella'ta's terme'szetes monopo'liumot teremto" technolo'gia'ja
miatt) nem jo', de kiva'na'tos, akkor mi a jo'?

***VD:  Kinek KIVANATOS?  Gondolom, vannak csoportok, akinek igen.  Kornyezeti
szempontbol az a kivanatos, hogy az energia-arak tukrozzek a piac hibait,
vagyis a market failure-k altal 'kihagyott' externalis koltsegeket is (errol 
azota ZP is irt).  Tehat, a piaci ar sokszor alatta van a kornyezeti
szempontbol
idealisnak - mert az externalis koltsegek, tehat azok, amiket mas es maskor
fizet meg (pl. a levegoszennyezes altal okozott egeszsegkarosodasok; a
keszletek lemeritesei, stb [bocs, Balazs, ezt foleg azoknak irom, akik nem
feltetlenul ismerik ezeket a kornyezetgazdasatani kifejezeseket.  Apropo, ha
tud valaki ezekre a magyar kifejezeseket, kerlek irjatok mar be a Kornyeszbe
egy szotar-szeruseget!).  Ez azert meg van spekelve azzal, hogy szocialis
szempontok neha felulmuljak a kornyezetieket; tehat hiaba kornyezetileg
idealisak az energiaarak, ha mar az emberek megfagytak, mert nem tudtak a
futes-szamlajukat kifizetni... Tehat ezt erdemesebb egy kicsit tudatosabban
szervezni, kinek fontos, hogy magasak legyenek a szamlai, de hol kell
alacsonyan
tartani.  Persze ugy , hogy osszesen azert a koltsegek fedezve legyenek (a
kulsok is).

> VB:  Sajnos, nem tudom az energia-a'rak pontos alakula'sa't az elmu'lt 10
e'vben, (aki tudja, tegye meg, hogy bege'peli),  de az az e'rze'sem, hogy
rea'le'rte'kben (infla'cio'val korriga'lva) nem volt olyan drasztikus.

***VD:  MOst csak gyorsan, mert rohanok, ezert csak inflacio nelkuli arak
kerultek a kezembe:  
Haztartasi energia-arak: 1980: 100%
1987:    160%
1988:     181%
1889      202%
1990      258%
1991      467%
1992      668%
1993      804%
1994:    1366%, csak becsult, korai forras. 
(ebben meg nincs benne a 95-os 50-70%-os emeles! ha azt belevesszuk, maris 
2300% korul jarunk)

Ezt osszevetheted inflacioval, de meg lennek lepve, ha 2300% kozeleben lett
volna az
inflacio 80 ota.  A fizetesekhez kepest ha nezzuk, akkor plane felmentek
realertekben.  

> VB:   U'gy ke'pzelem, inka'bb a szege'nyek szorulnak ra' a
nem-fizete'sre, ma'rpedig o"ket lehet 'es kell kompenza'lni az
a'remele'se'rt. 

***VD:  ebben egyetertunk.  Csak szerintem a kompenzacio nem jo modszer; azzal
konnyu kavarni es en szkeptiqs vagyok, hogy tenyleg eljut-e a megfelelo zsebbe
a garas, es nem csak a tovabbi burokratak es kavarogepek vesznek belole ujabb
hazat a Rozsadombon.  Szerintem a kompenzacio mar a fizetesnel, vagyis a
delikvensnek felszamitott arban kell hogy benne legyen.

>VB: De aka'rmi is a nemfizete's hata'sa, akik fizetnek, azokat a magasabb a'r
igenis takare'kossa'gra o~szto~nzi.

***VD: igen, amig van az arban elaszticitas.  A magyar lakossagi szektorban mar
szinte nincs, kiveve a gazdagabb retegeket (nekik szerintem is jol meg kellene
emelni az energia-arakat).  Ahogy ZP irta, a lakossag legszelesebb retegeiben
nincs toke az energiahatekonysagba valo fektetesre - ami csak a hasznalaton
mulik, azt mar lefaragtak.  Maguktol tobbet mar nem tudnak tenni.  Ugyanakkor 
meg rengeteg energiat dobunk ki az ablakon (pl. a
tavfutes szabalyozhatatlansagaval), de ezt pont az energiaszolgatato-vallalatok
tudnak megoldani.  Ez csak egy megfelelo szabalyozo-rendszerben lehetseges,
vagy allami keretek kozt, mert egy farkastorvenyek kozt uralkodo
energia-szolgaltatonak sosem lesz erdeke, hogy kevesebb energia foggyon.

Abban igazad van, hogy erdemes megkulonboztetni a kozep- es hosszutavu ar-
rugalmassagot.  Epp ezert gondolom ugy, hogy meg kell keresni, melyek azok a
retegek, ahol nagy a rugalmassag es nem jar egyutt komoly szocialis krizissel, 
es azokat kell celzott zold adokkal rakenyszeriteni a 6ekonysagra.

Az energia-politikaba pedig nem csak a szavazatukert aggodo politikusok szolnak
bele: sokkal izmosabb ellenfelek vannak altalaban az energiapolitikai
kuzdoteren: az igen eros energia- es ipari lobbik.  Az USAban az olaj- es az
autipar- lobbi, Magayrorszagon a szen- es atomlobbi, stb.  A kornyezeti
szempontok
csak igen ritkan kerulnek figyelembe vetelre - sajnos.  

>VB: Azt pedig, hogy az energiaa'rak mie'rt lenne'nek jo' eszko~zei pl. a
szolcia'lpolitika'nak (azaz a javak igazsa'gos u'jraelo'szta'sa'nak)
tova'bbra sem e'rtem. _Hiszen az energiafogyaszta's (nem gyo"zo~m
hangsu'lyozni) egyenesen ara'nyos az e'letszi'nvonallal_.

*** VD: Utterly mistaken :-).  Ez egy regebbi klasszikus kozgazdasagi
koncepcio, de mar elavult.  Az eletszinvional emelkedese tenyleg igen sokaig
kovette az energia-felhasznalas novekedeset; de a 70-es evek ota ez szepen
szetcsatolodott.  Nyugat-Europaban jo ideje stagnal az
ossz-energia-felhasznalas, mig az eletszinvonal jokorat emelkedett.  Keznel
adataim csak az USA elektromossag-felhasznalas vs. eletszinvonal
osszehasonlitasara vannak, ami nem jo pelda, mert ha az
ossz-energia-felhasznalas nem is megy fel, az elektromossag-fogyasztas meg
altalaban megy, mert az energiafelhasznalas mind nagyobb aranyban tolodik az
elektromossag fele.

Tehat: kb. 1977-ig tenyleg gyonyoruen kovette az elektromossag-felhasznalas a
GNP emelkedeset (7.3%/ev); 1977 ota az elektromossag-felhasznalas mar csak
2.5%-ot novekszik evente, mig a GNP 6.1%-ot novekedett.  Elegansabb magyarazat
es profibb adatok az "Energy for Planet  Earth"-ben talalhatoak. (azota
megneztem meg mas forrast is: 1970 ota az USA lakossagi energia-fogyasztasa az
elektromossagot kiveve minden energiahordozora stagnalt, amit az
eletszinvonalra ugyanazon ido alatt nem lehet elmondani)

Tehat, pontosan az egyre 6ekonyabb energia-felhasznalas miatt az eletszinvonal
es az energia-felhasznalas novekedese szetcsatolodott.  Kulonosen a belso
energia-hordozokban es kemeny-valutaban oly szegeny orszagokban, mint
Magyarorszag, az eletszinvonal-novekedes foleg energia-6ekonysaggal kepzelheto
csak el.  Hiszen minden ujabb egyseg energiafogyasztast importtal kell
kielegiteni, ami csak tovabb noveli a deficitet es a politikai fuggoseget. 

Diana

Mintha elhangzott volna kerdes valamikor biomassza-energiarol.
Ha nem, akkor is talan erdekes a kovetekzo osszefoglalo, amit egy 
kollegam irt a 
Kaliforniai biomassza-energia-termelesrol, ami a vilagon a legjelentosebb.
Diana


BIOMASS POWER GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA
By Gregg Morris

The California biomass electricity generating industry is the largest in 
the world. Over 950 megawatts of biomass-fired generating capacity has 
been constructed in the state over the past 15 years, representing an 
investment of more than a billion dollars in plant and equipment. Biomass 
energy sources and technologies figure prominently in nearly every 
group's vision of the nation's energy future. Nevertheless, there is 
precious little biomass energy project development activity going on in 
the country right now, and little expected at least through the turn of 
the century. The reason for this can be explained by a four-letter word: 
ngas (as in cheap and abundant natural gas).
The California biomass energy industry has weathered some difficult 
growing pains, and achieved a market balance in which most of the 
participants, including both fuel suppliers and users, are able to 
operate profitably at the present time. However, the industry faces three 
major, intertwined threats to its future:

--	Utility regulatory restructuring, which is being pioneered in 
California. Deregulation and restructuring will sweep the nation's 
electric utilities during the coming years.

--	The year 11 drop-off issue, wherein many biomass generating 
facilities 
will see their electricity sales revenues drop by a factor of three to 
five after ten years of operation.

--	Continuing utility offers to buyout power purchase contracts and 
shut 
down operating biomass power facilities.

Buyouts and shutdowns had shrunk the California biomass energy industry 
to 700 MW of operating capacity by the end of 1994. Seventy-five 
additional MWs have accepted buyouts since the first of the year. With 
each announcement the same theme has been sounded by the facility about 
to cease operations: "We don't want to do this, we are operating 
profitably right now, but the tremendous future uncertainty we are facing 
forces us to make this move."  The businessmen are making prudent 
business decisions. The industry is bleeding. These are disastrous times 
for biomass fuel producers. Their pain passes directly through to the 
agricultural, forestry, and waste disposal sectors.
	California's biomass power generators are facing the prospect of 
having 
to compete with natural-gas fired generators regardless of the outcome of 
the restructuring process. Most of the biomass power plants sell 
electricity to the utility companies at a price that is fixed in the 
power contract for the first ten years of operation. Currently, the PG&E 
fixed purchase price is 11.39 c/kWh. After ten years of operation the 
price paid for electricity reverts to the utility's short-run avoided 
cost. Currently, short-run avoided costs in California are in the 
neighborhood of 2-21/2 c/kWh. The current avoided cost would be hard 
pressed to support just the non-fuel operations and maintenance costs of 
a typical, well run biomass power plant. As one California generator who 
is already receiving payments based on short-run avoided cost recently 
remarked, "now we're paying them [PG&E] to take our electricity."
	Is there a role for biomass in the current market, when it 
clearly is 
not the low-cost generating source?  Should anybody, outside of the 
owners and employees of the facilities and their suppliers, care whether 
the biomass energy industry survives restructuring and/or the year-11 
cliff?  The answer to these questions is subsumed by the larger answer to 
the question:  Should environmental considerations, as well as price, be 
taken into account in the choice of generating sources used in the 
state?  
The only reasonable rationale for promoting policies that will allow 
survival of the current biomass generating industry requires an 
affirmative answer to the question of inclusion of environmental 
considerations in the source-selection process and, of course, the clear 
demonstration that biomass generating facilities do, indeed, achieve 
superior environmental performance. State law (California Environmental 
Quality Act) specifies that environmental and energy-diversity 
considerations, as well as price, should be taken into account in the 
determination of the state's energy supply mix.
	All power generating facilities are subject to environmental 
regulation 
by applicable environmental agencies on a facility by facility basis. 
However, there is no formal mechanism in place for taking environmental 
considerations into account in the choice between alternative electricity 
generating sources. The PUC is the most appropriate forum for this 
process. In the past, the PUC has taken various means to promote 
renewable generating sources, including offering favorable power purchase 
provisions, and providing set-asides or adders in utility 
resource-acquisition plans. The restructuring proposal issued in April, 
1994, excluded   consideration of environmental impacts. This stance was 
modified in December when the PUC announced that environmental 
considerations would be included as the restructuring process progressed.

	Renewables generally can be shown to have lower levels of 
environmental 
impact than fossil-fuel power generating systems. Biomass systems have 
the unique characteristic that, ancillary to the production of 
electricity, they also provide several important waste disposal services, 
such as reduced open burning in the agricultural valleys, reduced 
landfilling of sawmill and urban waste wood, and reduced  risks of forest 
fires due to the removal of forest residues. These waste disposal 
benefits currently are provided by the biomass power industry without 
explicit compensation. Their loss would severely complicate the tasks of 
many California air and solid waste agencies trying to meet environmental 
standards.
	In order to pursue their collective and unique interests, most of 
the 
biomass power facilities in California have banded together to form the 
California Biomass Energy Alliance (CBEA). The CBEA is pursuing a 
two-pronged approach intended to secure the future for their industry. 
This includes a legislative agenda that involves support for three 
different initiatives (two state, one federal), and participation in the 
on-going electric utility restructuring process at the PUC.
	The first of the legislative initiatives being pursued by the 
CBEA would 
establish an allocation of 1.5 percent for biomass-produced energy in all 
future resource allocation plans that may be carried out in the state. 
This would include set-asides of that amount within supplier pools, 
should such pools become the practice in a retail-wheeling market 
environment. The suggested allocation is large enough to accommodate the 
existing biomass industries, and to allow for future growth through 
competition and overall market growth.
	The second legislative initiative would secure a floor price for 
the 
utility purchase of electricity produced by biomass energy facilities. 
The proposed legislation would be financed by levying a surcharge on all 
customer bills in the state. The collected funds would underwrite a base 
rate for biomass power producers of 6.5 cents per kWh, making up the 
difference (if any) between short-run avoided cost rates, any available 
subsidies, and the floor price for the eligible facilities. The necessary 
surcharge to fund this initiative would be imperceptible. The 6.5 cent 
per kWh base rate would be applied to any particular facility when it 
reaches its year-11 cliff point, and remain active for a period of three 
to five years.
The third legislative initiative being pursued by the California biomass 
energy industry is an effort to extend the 1.5 cent per kWh federal 
closed-loop biomass tax credit to all biomass power generating 
facilities. This tax credit, which is contained in the 1992 National 
Energy Policy Act, is restricted to biomass facilities that grow the fuel 
they consume, leaving facilities that use waste and residue forms of 
biomass out in the cold, this despite the fact that it is easily 
demonstrated that waste biomass use is environmentally superior to fuel 
farming in virtually every way. Waste and residue biomass use is also 
cheaper than fuel farming, and accounts for virtually the entire biomass 
power plant fuel supply in the U.S. The 1.5 cent per kWh tax credit is 
not  large enough to promote any substantial development of closed-loop 
biomass power generators in the U.S. It might be large enough to allow 
the continued operation of existing generators who use waste and residue 
forms of fuel and sell electricity in a price-driven marketplace.